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ALBERT YORBA et aI. t Appellants, v. ANAHEIM UNION 
WATER com ANY (a Corporati0D:) et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Adverse Possession - OontiDuit7 of Possession - B7 Suit.-
While ordinarily the flliDg of an action. either by person 
asserting a prescriptive right or by person against whom th" 
statute of limitations is running, will in~pt running of 
prescriptive period and statute will be tolled while action is 
actively pending, an action that has been dismissed or aban-
doned does not interrupt running of prescriptive period. 
[1] Time covered by pendency of suit discontinued without de-
cision on merits as included in computation of period of adverse 
possession, note, 80 AL.R. 439. See, also, Oal . .Tur.2d, Adverse 
Possession, § 60; Am • .Tur., .Adverse Possession, § 180 et seq. , 
McR. Dig. References: [1] Adverse Possesllion, § 82; [2] Waters, 












Waters-Prescriptive Rights-Bringing of Suit as htemp-
tion.-Where plaintiffs' predecessors in interest, as owners of 
land bordering a river, could have secured a final adjudication 
on the merits of their riparian rights in an action instituted 
by a water company to quiet title to that portion of water 
which it had been diverting from river at a point above plain-
tiffs' land, but instead, after entry of a preliminary injunction 
zestraining them and certain irrigators from interfering with 
auch diversion, abandoned the action and acquiesced in an ar-
rangement whereby water company and irrigators secured 
half of normal flow of river to their exclusion, the action did 
not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, and the 
preliminary injunction did not toll the statute where it did 
prevent plaintiffs' predecessors in interest from asserting their 
rights or from establishing their rights by legal action. (See 
Code Civ. Proe., § 356.) 
Id.-Procedure in Water Litigation - Evidence - Diversion-
Waste.-An implied finding that water diverted from river by 
defendant water company at point above plaintiffs' land has 
been applied to beneficial use without waste is sustainoo by 
evidence that the water has been used for irrigation, that the 
supply is frequently short, that in more recent years it has 
been necessary to augment water diverted from river by pump-
ing from wells, that water company was endeavoring to con-
serve water supply, and that an arrangetnent had been made to 
have water company deliver water from its canal to ditch of 
defendant irrigation company instead of releasing water into 
river bed so that irrigators could divert it downstream. 
ld.-Procedure in Water Litigation-Findings.-ln action by 
owners of land bordering on river to establish a servitude in 
eanal of defendant water company, based on conditions con-
tained in deeds whereby plaintiffs' predecessors in interest 
granted an easement to another water company for con-
struction of the canal across their land, it is unnecessary to 
decide whether such conditions were sufficient to create a 
servitude in canal in favor of grantors that would be binding 
on successors in interest of grantee, where defendant's prede-
cessor in interest acquired the easement by prescription and 
not by conveyance froL} the other water company, and where 
trial court could reasonably conclude that defendant, in a prior 
action involving its right to divert water from river, asserted 
its rights in canal adversely, not only to other water company, 
but also to plaintiffs' predecessors in interest. 
ld.-Procedure in Water Litigation-Findings.-ln action to 
establish priority of plaintiffs' riparian rights over any rights 
defendants might claim in river, any error in finding that 
certain parcels of plaintiffs' land no longer have riparian rights 
» immaterial where defendants have established a superior 
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prescriptive right against plaintilfs to divert the half of the 
Dormal surface flow of river which is at issue into canal across 
plaintiffs' land. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange 
County. Robert Gardner, Judge. Affirmed in part and re-
versed in part. . 
Action to quiet title and for declaratory relief. Judgment 
declaring plaintiffs owners of certain riparian rights, de-
termining prescriptive rights of defendants to divert portion 
of water from river, etc., affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Harry M. Irwin, Forgy, Reinhaus & Forgy and Fred Forgy 
for Appellants. 
H. C. Head, It. C. Mize, Cosgrove, Cramer, Diether & 
Rindge, T. B. Cosgrove, Head, Jacobs & Corfman and H. C. 
Head for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiffs are the owners of 21 parcels of 
land located on the north side of the Santa Ana River in 
Orange County. In 1874 this land was all riparian to the 
river and consisted of the Prudencio Yorba, Vicente Yorba, 
and William McKey allotments of the Rancho Canon de Santa 
Ana. These allotments were contiguous and each abutted on 
the river. They were brought under the common ownership 
of Prudencio Yorba by 1879, and since that date plaintiffs 
have succeeded to his interest. Approximately 5 miles up-
stream to the east of the easterly border of plaintiffs' land 
is the intake of defendant Anaheim Union Water Company's 
Cajon Canal. This canal runs in a generally westerly direction 
on the north side of the river and carries the river water across 
plaintiffs' land for use on land lying downstream and to the 
west thereof. Approximately a mile and a half apstream to 
the east of· plaintiffs' land on the south side of the river is 
the intake of the Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Company 
eanal. Water diverted into this canal is used on land lying 
to the south of the river. At the present time the Anaheim 
company divides the normal surface flow of the river into two 
equal parts and diverts half of it into its Cajon Canal. The 
remaining half is diverted by the Santa Ana company before 
it reaches plaintiffs' land. From the Cajon Canal, the Ana-
heim company delivers 100 miner's inches of water for use 
/ 
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on land lying upstream from plaintiffs' land, 200 inches to 
defendant Yorba Irrigation Company for use on land lying 
downstream from plainti1is' land, and it supplies the re-
mainder of the :flow to its stockholders for use on their land 
lying downstream from plainti1is' land. Various of the plain-
tiffs or their predecessors in interest tapped the canal with 
pipes at seven locations and used the water taken through 
these pipes on their land. 
In 1949 plainti1is filed this action against the Anaheim 
Union Water Company and the Yorba Irrigation Company. 
In their first cause of action they alleged that their land was 
riparian to the river, and they sought to establish the priority 
of their riparian rights over any water rights defendants might 
claim in the river. By their second cause of action they sought 
to establish a servitude in the Cajon Canal. They alleged 
that they were entitled to the free use of water from the 
canal for watering stock and for domestic purposes and to 
the privileges of stockholders in the Anaheim company in 
obtaining water for other purposes. This claim was based 
on conditions contained in deeds, executed in 1876, by which 
plaintiffs' predecessors in interest granted an easement to 
the Canon de Santa Ana Water Company for the construction 
of the Cajon Canal. 
The trial court found that certain parcels of plainti1is' land 
were riparian and that others had lost their riparian rights 
either by conveyances of water rights or by severance of con-
tiguity with the river. It further found that defendants' 
predecessors in interest had acquired the Cajon Canal and 
easements therefor across plainti1is' land by prescription and 
not by virtue of any conveyance from the Canon de Santa 
Ana Water Company, and that, prior to 1903, the Anaheim 
company had acquired by prescription the right to divert one 
half of the normal surface :flow of the Santa Ana River into 
the Cajon Canal and carry such water across plainti1is' land, 
subject to the right of certain upstream owners to receive 
100 miner's inches and the right of the Yorba company to 
receive 2'00 miner's inches. It also found, however, that cer-
tain of the plaintiffs had acquired by prescription the right 
to divert water from the canal through the seven pipes here-
inabove mentioned. Judgment was entered accordingly, and 
plaintiffs appeal. 
Plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence to support the 
finding that the full prescriptive period had run against them 
prior to 1903. Defendant Anaheim Union Water Company 
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was organized in 1884 and succeeded to the rights of various 
smaller water companies that had been diverting water from 
the north bank of the Santa Ana River. It did not, however, 
succeed to the water rights of the irrigators who were divert-
ing water by means of the Yorba ditch. These irrigators later 
conveyed their water rights to defendant Yorba Irrigation Com-
pany, and their land, which is now supplied by the Yorba 
company, lies downstream from plaintiffs' land. In 1885 
the Anaheim company brought an action against plaintiffs' 
predecessors in interest and the Yorba irrigators to quiet 
title to one half of the water of the river less 125 miner's 
inches, and to enjoin the defendants from diverting water 
to which the Anaheim company claimed it was entitled. It 
alleged that it owned various ditches and canals, including 
the Cajon Canal, and that the defendants were interfering 
with its rights by diverting as much as 400 inches of water. 
The defendants answered and denied that the Anaheim com-
pany was the owner of the Cajon Canal or the water rights 
claimed and alleged their own prescriptive rights to continue 
diverting water from the river. Although both the prede-
cessors in interest of the plaintiffs in the present action and 
the Yorba irrigators were named as defendants in the 1885 
action, it appears that the primary purpose of that action was 
to establish the respective rights of the Anaheim company 
and the Yorba irrigators to the half of the flow of the river 
being diverted on the north side. Thus in 1891 a preliminary 
injunction was entered in that ao::tion whereby the defendants 
were enjoined from interfering with the Anaheim company's 
diversion on condition that th Anaheim company deliver 
200 miner's inches from the Cajon Canal into the Yorba 
ditch. In 1903 the place of dt]very of the water specified 
in the injunction was change.~ by agreement of the parties, 
but in all other respects the p!'-::iminary injunction was left 
in effect. The Anaheim eo!:.:;:~y and the Yorba irrigators 
and their successor, defen~: Yorba Irrigation Company, 
were satisfied with this di";..£:::: of water, and it is still in 
effect. No further procee-f:-r r: :.ave been taken in the 1885 
action, and it is still pena:·: 
It is clear that if the di,~:-::: and division of waters for-
malized in the 1891 prelir-:~ <:- :njunction had been effected 
solely by adverse use with-:-::: ~~ intervention of legal action, 
and if the water diverted h: :,,:,:u devoted to beneficial use, 
defendants in this actio~ -v--:--": have perfected their pre-
scriptive rights against r' s' .• , before 1903, as the trial 
) 
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court found. Plainti1Is contend, however, that there is no 
evidence that the Anaheim company had diverted half of 
the normal flow of the river before the 1885 action was filed 
and that the filing of that action stopped the running of the 
preScriptive period against them. [1] It is true that ordi-
narily the filing of an action, either by the person asserting 
a prescriptive right, or by the person against whom the 
statute of limitations is running, will interrupt the running 
of jhe prescriptive period, and the statute will be tolled while 
the action is actively pending. (Knoke v. Swan, 2 Cal.2d 
630, 632 [42 P.2d 1019, 97 A.L.R. 841] ; Estate of Richards, 
154 Cal. 478, 488 [98 P. 528] ; Alta Land etc. 00. v. Hancock, 
85 Cal. 219, 228 [24 P. 645, 20 Am.St.Rep. 217]; Spotts v. 
Hanley, 85 Cal. 155, 170 [24 P. 738] ; Newman v. Bank of 
Oalifornia, 80 Cal. 368, 373 [22 P. 261, 13 Am.St.Rep. 169, 
5 L.R.A. 467].) On the other hand, however, an action 
that has been dismissed or abandoned does not interrupt the 
running of the prescriptive period. (Langford v. Poppe, 
56 Cal. 73, 76-77; Breon v. Bobrecht, 118 Cal. 469, 470 [50 
P. 689, 51 P. 33, 62 Am.St.Rep. 247]; Dong Ohun Len v. 
Luke Kow Lee, 7 Cal.App.2d 194, 196 [45 P.2d 827]; Gi"bbs 
v. Lester, (Tex.Com.App.) 41 S.W.2d 28, 32, 80 A.L.R. 
431; Thompson v. Ratcliff. (Ky.App.) 245 S.W.2d 592, 594; 
see anno., 80 A.L.R. 439.) 
[2] The facts of the present case bring it within the fore-
going rule. Under the pleadings in the 1885 action plainti1Is' 
predecessors in interest could have secured a final adjudica-
tion on the merits of their riparian rights in the river and 
thereby have prevented defendants from acquiring any new 
prescriptive rights after that action was filed. (Newman v. 
Bank of Oalifornia, supra, 80 Cal. 368, 373; Spotts v. Hanley, 
supra, 85 Cal. 155, 170; Breon v. Robrecltt, supra, 118 Cal. 
469, 470.) They did not do so, however, but instead aban-
doned the action and acquiesced in an arrangement whereby 
the Anaheim company and the Yorba irrigators secured 
half of the normal surface flow of the river to their exclusion. 
The preliminary injunction did not, as plaintiffs con-
tend, toll the statute by preventing their predecessors in 
interest from asserting their rights. (See Code Civ. Proc. 
§ 356; Elliott ~ Horne v. Chambers Land Co., 61 Cal.App. 
310, 312 [215 P. 99].) Although the injunction prevented 
them from physically interfering with the Anaheim com-
pany's diversion, it did not prevent them from establishing 
their rights by legal action. 
,/ 
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[3] Plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence that the 
water diverted by defendants has been applied to beneficial 
use without waste. There is evidence, however, that the 
water has been used for irrigation and that the supply is 
frequently short. In more recent years it has been necessary 
to augment the water diverted from the river by pumping 
from wells. Plaintiffs rely on a statement made in a report 
of the state engineer published in 1888 that the Anaheim 
company's works "are not economical of the supply." Read 
in context, however, the engineer's statement does not indi-
cate that water was being wasted. His report stated that 
"The supply of water for this district [supplied by the Ana-
heim company] is short. As to the actual facts with respect 
to volumes, those, as far as known, will be found in the spe-
cial chapter on water-supply, to follow. The works are not 
economical of the supply. A perfected system would prob-
ably greatly relieve the district from embarrassment on this 
score. The problem is not a simple one. Just what should 
be done for economy's sake and to insure best results is a 
point not to be quickly or lightly determined." The report 
also pointed out the difficulty of preventing loss of water 
through seepage into porous soil. There is evidence that the 
Anaheim company was endeavoring to conserve the water 
supply. The intake of the Cajon Canal was located well up-
stream to prevent loss of water in the sandy bottom of the 
lower river. It may be inferred that the Anaheim company 
and the Yorba irrigators were able to prevent the loss of a 
considerable quantity of water in the river bed by arranging 
to have the Anaheim company deliver water to the Yorba 
ditch from the Cajon Canal instead of releasing it into the 
river bed so that the Yorba irrigators could divert it down 
stream. The trial court could reasonably conclude that 
defendants did whatever was reasonably possible to conserve 
the water supply and thus applied the water to beneficial 
use without waste. 
[4] In 1876 plaintiffs' predecessors in interest deeded 
the right of way ft)r the Cajon Canal to the Canon de Santa 
Ana Water yompany. The deeds Mntained a provision that 
the grantors should "have the same privileges as full stock-
holders in obtaining water," and should "be supplied with 
the same at the lowest rate at which water is furnished," 
and should "have free of cost all water necessary for domes-
tic purposes and for watering stock at convenient places on 
the said canal. " Plaintiffs contend that this provision created 
) 
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a servitude in their favor in the canal. Although the prede-
cessor in interest of the Anaheim company acquired the right 
of way by prescription and not by conveyance from the 
Canon de Santa Ana Water Company, plaintiffs contend that 
the right of way was not acquired adversely to their servi-
tude. It is unnecessary to decide whether the provision in 
the deeds was sufficient to create a servitude in the canal in 
favor of the grantors that would be binding on successors 
in interest of the grantee. In the 1885 action the Anaheim 
company asserted its rights in the Cajon Canal against plain-
tiffs' predecessors in interest. The answer denied that the 
Anaheim company owned the canal. Accordingly, the trial 
court could reasonably conclude that the Anaheim company 
asserted rights in the canal adversely, not only to the Canon 
de Santa Ana Water Company, but to plaintiffs' predecessors 
in interest as well. Thus the alleged servitude, if it existed 
at RD, was extinguished by the running of the statutory 
period after 1885. 
[5] Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in find-
ing that certain parcels of their land no longer have riparian 
rights in the river. If plaintiffs had been successful in 
establishing the priority of riparian rights over defendants' 
appropriative rights, the findings with respect to which par-
cels still enjoy riparian rights would be material in deter-
mining how much of the water plaintiffs could reasonably use 
on their riparian lands. (See Cal. Const., art. XIV. § S.) 
Since, however. defendants have established a superior pre-
scriptive right against all of the plaintiffs to divert half of 
the normal surface flow of the river into the Cajon Canal, 
the question of which of plaintiffs' lands still enjoy riparian 
rights is immaterial for the purposes of this action. This 
question might become important. however, between plain-
tiffs themselves with respect to the subsurface flow of the 
river that is not diverted by the Anaheim company and the 
Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Company. It might also be-
come important if either of those companies stopped or re-
duced their present diversions. which together absorb the 
entire normal surface flow of the river. Since. however, the 
question is no longer material in this action. and since its 
determination might raise serious problems of res judicata 
in the event of future litigation among plaintiffs themselves. 
it is inappropriate that it should be determined in an action 
in which they have not taken adversary positions. For the 
same reasons no determination should be made of the ques-
I 
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tion whether certain of the plaintiffs are or are not the 
owners of the fee of the railroad right of way crossing their 
lands. 
Accordingly, to the extent that the judgment determines 
that certain of plaintiffs' lands are not riparian to the river, 
and to the extent that it determines that certain plaintiffs are 
not the owners of the railroad right of way, it is reversed. 
In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Defendants 
are to recover costs on this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied August 
6,1953. 
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